No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/28: LOC-HAK-352-8-10-1

7606421

O/FADRC/DR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FILES

WASHINGTON

Attention.

Keep this study together.

March 27, 1976

Copies to:

H S/PRS

Dear Jim:

S/PRS RF (ek)

I appreciate your writing about your concerns over the Evans-Novak column of March 22 on US-Soviet relations. Hal Sonnenfeldt tells me he has already spoken to you on the phone but I wanted to confirm to you in writing that the column in question does not reflect our policy toward Eastern Europe.

I wish to assure you that our long-standing policy toward Eastern Europe has not changed and that the newspaper rendition of the discussions with Ambassadors in London and of Mr. Sonnenfeldt's remarks on that occasion is severely distorted.

Our policy in no sense accepts Soviet "dominion" of Eastern Europe nor is it in any way designed to seek the consolidation of such "dominion". On the contrary, we seek to be responsive to, and to encourage as responsibly as possible, the desires after normal relations with the rest of the world. It is our objective that in this way there should also occur a greater Soviet acceptance of this autonomy and independence. These basic policies have been consistently reaffirmed by us in word and deed, including in the course of Presidential and my visits to the region and in the President's as well as my own meetings with governmental leaders from East European countries. It is deplorable that a widely-circulated newspaper column should imply that we have a surreptitious policy for Eastern Europe that is at variance with our announced policy.

C:HSomenfeldt/H:KBJenkins:rms 3/25//6 x24404 x23436 Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

1976 1498 21 FM 10 22

The Honorable
James L. Buckley,
United States Senate.



### UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON, D. C.

JAMES L. BUCKLEY NEW YORK

March 22, 1976

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Department of State 2201 C Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

This morning's Evans and Novak column stated that in December at a briefing of our European ambassadors in London, State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt stated that "it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one."

If this quotation is accurate, it lends itself to only one interpretation; namely, that Mr.
Sonmenfeldt is advocating a policy in which the
United States will actively seek a consolidation
of Soviet dominion, and all that means, over the
peoples and nations of Eastern Europe.

I need to know whether the substance of Mr. Sonnenfeldt's remarks is accurately reported; and if so, whether it reflects your own views.

You should know that I consider this matter to be of the greatest importance.

Yours sincerely,

cc: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

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### A Doviet-Last Lurope

# 'Organic Union'

Intense debate was set off within the Ford administration three months ago when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's right hand man declared in a secret briefing that permanent "organic" union between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is necessary to avoid World War III.

That policy, going well beyond any public position of the U.S. government, was enunciated in mid-December by State Department counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt. He told a London meeting of U.S. ambassadors to European nations that the "inorganic, unnatural relationship" between Moscow and Eastern Europe based on Soviet military: prowess threatens world peace. "So," he concluded, "it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one."

When transcripts of Sonnenfeldt's remarks hit Washington, some officials complained that this amounted to U.S. underwriting of Soviet dominion over Eastern Europe. As such, these critics contended, the Sonnenfeldt doctrine never had been U.S. policy and certainly should not be now.

Indeed, what was said three months ago may be the victim of President Ford's election-year harder line which has made "detente" an unword. Nevertheless, the Sonnenfeldt doctrine exposes underpinnings of detente as practiced in the State Department until recently.

in their December briefing in London, both Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt stressed the need for the U.S. to come to ferms with the Soviet Union as an emerging superpower — now their principal rationale for detente. Contending NATO is undermined by leftist gains in Western Europe, Kissinger declared: "The dominance of Communist parties in the West is unacceptable." That doctrine has no critics within the administration — in total contrast to Sonnenfeldt's message.

Lacking the attractiveness of past empires, Sonnenfeldt declared, the Krimilin relies on "the presence of sheer Soviet military power" to unify Eastern Europe. Because "a more viable, organic structure" is lacking, "the desire to break out of the Soviet strait jacket" has intensified among Eastern European countries.

The counselor saw this as no boon for the West, declaring: "The Soviets' inability to acquire loyalty in Eastern Europe is an unfortunate historical failure because Eastern Europe is

the Soviet Union to establish roots of interest that go beyond sheer power."

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After describing detente as a means of affecting the use of Soviet power, Sonnenfeldt warned Eastern Europe's "present unnatural relationship with the Soviet Union" may "sooner or later explode, causing World War III. This inorganic, unnatural relationship is a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West."

Sonnenfeldt cautioned that "any excess of zeal on our part" could reverse the "desired process" (the Soviet-Eastern European "organic" union). Consequently, he set "a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence. This has worked in Poland. The Poles have been able to overcome their romantic political inclinations which led to their disasters in the past."

While declaring a post-Tito return of Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit would be "a major strategic setback," Sonnenfeldt suggested the Yugoslavs "should be less obnoxious" to Moscow and disabused of the impression "they have a free ride" of independence guaranteed by Washington.

Critics inside the administration, describing themselves as "appalled" by the Sonnenfeldt doctrine, do not propose encouragement of futile anti-Communist insurrection in Eastern Europe. But they believe Sonnenfeldt's confirmation of Soviet dominion there undercuts Eastern European nationalists such as President Nicolae Ceaucescu of Rumania.

While ruling out Communist party control in Portugal or Italy, Dr. Kissinger's London briefing blamed the danger on the West's own problems, including "domestic paralysis in the U.S."

"The Soviets are not the key element in producing the present instabilities that we now face in Western Europe," he declared. "A Communist Western Europe would be a headache for us. It would be a headache for the Soviets as well. They probably prefer not to see Communist powers taking over in Western Europe. But in the final analysis their ideology requires them to assist in these efforts."

To avoid assistance from Moscow, Kissinger asserted, "we must create the maximum incentives for a moderate Soviet course." But Sonnenfeldt, usually the faithful mirror of his chief, goes even further by putting the U.S.

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#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

#### ACTION MEMORANDUM

760-6421



#### UNCLASSIFIED

March 26, 1976

TO : The Secretary

FROM: H - Robert J. McCloskey

Reply to Jim Buckley on the Evans-Novak
Column re US-Soviet Relations

Attached is a draft reply to Senator Buckley prepared by Hal Sonnenfeldt and changed as you requested. We will send it over to the NSC (Bill Hyland) for their use in replying to what we understand is a parallel Buckley letter to the President on the same subject.

#### Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter to Senator Buckley.

#### Attachment:

Proposed letter for signature

UNCLASSIFIED

H:KBJenkins:rms 3/26/76

## THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

Dear Jim:

I appreciate your writing about your concerns over the Evans-Novak column of March 22 on US-Soviet relations. Hal Sonnenfeldt tells me he has already spoken to you on the phone but I wanted to confirm to you in writing that the column in question does not reflect our policy toward Eastern Europe.

I wish to assure you that our long-standing policy toward Eastern Europe has not changed and that the newspaper rendition of the discussions with Ambassadors in London and of Mr. Sonnenfeldt's remarks on that occasion is severely distorted.

Our policy in no sense accepts Soviet "dominion" of Eastern Europe nor is it in any way designed to seek the consolidation of such "dominion". On the contrary, we seek to be responsive to, and encourage as responsibly as possible, the desires of East Europeans for greater autonomy, independence and more normal relations with the rest of the world. our objective that in this way there should also occur a gradually greater Soviet acceptance of this autonomy and independence. In pursuing these policies, we must, at the same time, exercise care so as not to contribute to any turn of events that will lead to a recurrence of the tragedies of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These basic policies have been consistently reaffirmed by us in word and deed, including in the course of Presidential visits to the region and in the President's as well as my own meetings with governmental leaders from East European countries. It is deplorable that a widely-circulated newspaper column should call our purposes and policies into question.

Warm regards,

and my

Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable
James L. Buckley,
United States Senate.



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